SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Investigations

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Original - Return to D/Security 1 - DDCI

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ORIGINATOR:

25X1A

Robert W. Gambino Director of Security

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ADDA: MJMalanick (26 Oct 76)

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FORM NO. 237

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Memo dtd 7 Oct 76 to DDCI fr Acting Att:

DDA, subj Counterintelligence

Investigations

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SUBJECT: 'Aprilonal')					
Counterintelligence Inv			stigat	ions No.	
FROM:			EXTENSION		
Robert W. Gambino				DATE 5 OCT 1976	
Director of Security			6777		
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)			OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.	
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED			
1. Acting DD/A 7D-24 Headquarters	70	CT 1976	m		
Asst. to DDC1		10/8	duc		
3DDCI					
4.	7 3 19			2 to 4: Executive Registry.	
A/DDA			m	76-5409/1	
5.				Mike: I would like to come and	
		 		discuss this with you at your earliest convenience.	
6. D/Security 4E-60 Headquarters			25X1A	has some suggestions which I agree	
7.	-			with. It involves the inadequacy of our regulation on certain subjects, which	
8.				you will remember was disco	
				Regulations Task Force chaired by Tony Lapham.	
9.					
10.		·		25X1A	
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Substitute for

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c. RESPONSIBILITIES

- (1) DIRECTOR OF SECURITY. The Director of Security is responsible for:
 - (a) Notifying the Director of Central Intelligence of any active counterintelligence investigation of a specific Agency employee and keeping him informed of pertinent developments. The Director of Security and the Director of Central Intelligence will review pertinent data and determine the appropriateness of informing any other Responsible Authority. Once a Responsible Authority is so advised, the counterintelligence investigation conducted on the subject will be concluded within one year unless extended by the Director of Central Intelligence.
 - (b) Within the specific limitations of (a) above notify the Responsible Authority concerned of any matter affecting the security of his operations:
 - (c) As written
 - (d) As written
 - (e) As written

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DD/A Registry 16-52/1

Me Security

19 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

25X1A FROM

Acting Director of Security

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SUBJECT

Suspected Tampering with Photo-processing

Equipment

1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1076 this Office was notified by the Chief of Security, site) that there had been a series of suspicions which would indicate that someone may have been tampering with the photo-processing equipment. Over a three-week period, with the photo-processing equipment. Over a three-week period, knobs, screws, and valves on the machines had been found in positions other than normal; level settings had been changed, and finally, on 30 September, a wire had been discovered severed and finally, on 30 September, a wire had been discovered severed. This particular section of the Project is manned by employees. The Incorporated, under contract to the Agency. The

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Incorporated, under contract to the Agency. The all cleared for appropriate compartmented security access approvals. The operation requires a 24-hour, seven-day schedule with four crews of approximately 19 people each, working on alternating shifts. Most of the reported incidents occurred during the duty time of one particular shift.

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3. A security file review of all four crews was accomplished with no leads. Chief of OD&E Security therefore requested that this Office conduct interviews of the shift workers 25X1A most closely associated with the machines in question. These interviews were accomplished between 8 and 14 October,

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with a total of 70 persons being interviewed. No personnel were identified as having any connection with deliberate tampering with machine settings. It was generally believed that the reported events were the result of human error, carelessness, maintenance malfunction, forgetfulness, or the inevitable "gremlins" connected with machine operations. The most perplexing incident, the severed wire, caused great concern among most employees interviewed; however, several of the operationally knowledgeable personnel advised that this, too, was most likely a machine malfunction.

- 4. As a result of our investigation, it is the conclusion of the Office of Security that there has been no intentional tampering with the photo-processing equipment, and that the problems were most likely caused by human error.
- 5. We have briefed appropriate Directorate of Science and Technology officials concerning the results of our inquiry, and we are in the process of preparing a formal written report. Most certainly you will be kept advised if there are any significant new developments.

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